Information technology enabled exchanges in electronic markets
have significant implications for buyer–supplier relationships.
Building on studies that emphasize the role of intangible assets in
interorganizational relationships, this study argues that buyers are
less likely to use reverse auctions for supplier relationships
involving a high degree of non-contractibility. The argument
complements traditional transaction cost economics arguments that
focus on the impact of asset specificity and product specialization.
We identify six dimensions of non-contractibility—quality, supplier
technological investments, information exchange, responsiveness,
trust, and flexibility—which encompass task-based and
interaction-based non-contractibility. The study finds that,
together with product specialization, these non-contractible
elements of interorganizational relationships have greater
explanatory power for reverse auction use than asset specificity.
This result highlights the importance of supplier investments in
non-contractible elements of exchange relationships in an
increasingly dynamic service- and knowledge-based economy.
Keywords:
Reverse auctions, procurement auctions, electronic markets,
transaction cost economics, interorganizational relationships,
buyer–supplier relationships, incomplete contracts approach,
non-contractibility, business-to-business auctions